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The tontine, which is an interesting mixture of group annuity, group life insurance, and lottery, has
a peculiar place in economic history. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it played a major
role in raising funds to finance public goods in Europe, but today it is rarely encountered outside of
murder mysteries. This study provides a formal model of individual contribution decisions under a
tontine mechanism. We analyze the performance of tontines and compare them to another popular
fundraising scheme used today by both government and charitable fundraisers: lotteries. Our major
theoretical results are that (i) the optimal tontine for agents with identical valuations of the public
good consists of all agents receiving a fixed "prize" amount in the first period equal to a percentage
of their total contribution, (ii) contribution levels in the optimal tontine are identical to those of risk-
neutral agents in an equivalently valued single prize lottery, (iii) contribution levels for the optimal
tontine are independent of risk-aversion, and thereby outperform lotteries when agents are risk-
averse, (iv) if agents are sufficiently asymmetric in their valuation of the public good, equilibrium
contribution levels are larger under tontines than any lottery. In particular, one can obtain full
participation in the tontine mechanism compared to only partial participation in a lottery. These
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mprice@arec.umd.edutontine:  An annuity scheme wherein participants share certain benefits and on 
the death of any participant his benefits are redistributed among the remaining 
participants; can run for a fixed period of time or until the death of all but one 




  The oldest standing bridge in London (Richmond Bridge), numerous public 
buildings and other municipality projects throughout the U.S., Britain, the Netherlands, 
Ireland, and France, and several wars, including the Nine Years’ War, all share a 
common thread:  they were wholly, or partially, funded by tontines.  The idea of the 
tontine is believed to have originated in 1652, when an expatriate banker, Lorenzo Tonti, 
proposed a new mechanism for raising public funds to Cardinal Mazarin of France.
1  
Tonti advertised his idea as “A gold mine for the king….a treasure hidden away from the 
realm.”  The salesmanship of Tonti coupled with the difficulties associated with raising 
taxes in seventeenth century France led to an enthusiastic endorsement from King Louis 
XIV.  While the idea, and many affiliated derivatives, prospered as major tools for 
financing public goods for several decades, tontines have since been banned in Britain 
and the United States due to the potential incentive for investors to kill one another in 
order to increase their shares.
2   
In essence, a tontine is a mixture of group annuity, group life insurance, and 
lottery.  While the use and economic operation of each of these components is understood 
as a vehicle for individual investment/leisure, as a means to fund public goods, the 
                                                 
1 Similar mechanisms are believed to have been employed in the Roman Empire several centuries earlier.  
Tonti’s mechanism should not be confused with the tontines in Western Africa, which are small, informal 
savings and loan associations similar to ROSCAs (Rotating Savings and Credit Associations). 
2 As an aside, this allure of the tontine has led to a fantastic plot device for detective story writers (the 
interested reader should see, e.g., The Wrong Box by Robert Louis Stevenson, which was made into a film 
in 1966 starring Peter Cook, Dudley Moore, Ralph Richardson, Michael Caine, and Tony Hancock). 
1 tontine itself has largely been ignored.  It is well established that relying upon voluntary 
contributions for the provision of public goods generally results in the under provision of 
such goods relative to first-best levels.  Numerous mechanisms have been proposed to 
alleviate the tendency of agents to free-ride (see e.g., Groves and Ledyard 1977; Walker 
1981; Bagnoli and McKee 1991; Varian 1994; Falkinger 1996).   
This study adds to the literature on voluntary provision of public goods by 
formally investigating the performance and optimal design of the tontine.  In this spirit, 
we provide information about the history and modeling results of tontines in order to 
encourage usage of the best characteristics of the institution in the future.  We begin by 
outlining the conditions that define an optimal tontine—one that maximizes total group 
contribution levels—when symmetric risk-neutral agents have quasi-linear preferences.  
Properties of tontines are also explored upon relaxation of symmetry and risk neutrality.  
We then compare the performance of the tontine to a popular fundraising scheme used 
today:  lotteries (see, e.g., Morgan 2000 and Lange et al. 2004).
3   
Our main findings are as follows: (i) the optimal for tontine for agents with 
identical valuations of the public good consists of all agents receiving a fixed “prize” 
amount in the first period equal to a percentage of their total contribution, (ii) 
contribution levels in this optimal tontine are identical to those of risk-neutral agents in 
an equivalently valued single prize lottery, (iii) contribution levels for the optimal tontine 
are independent of risk-aversion, and (iv) with sufficient, and plausible, risk-aversion or 
asymmetry in individual valuations of the public good, tontines yield higher contributions 
                                                 
3 Relatedly, Engers and McManus (2002) and Goeree et al. (2004) explore the use of auctions to raise 
money to finance public goods, and Andreoni (1998) and List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) explore the 
voluntary contributions mechanism with and without announcements of “seed” money.   
 
2 than the optimal lottery.  Further, one can obtain full participation in the tontine 
mechanism compared to partial participation in the lottery mechanism.  These results 
have clear implications for empiricists and practitioners in the design of fundraising 
campaigns.  Further, they provide useful avenues for future theoretical work on voluntary 
provisioning of public goods. 
The remainder of our study is crafted as follows.  Section II provides a brief 
historical overview of tontines.  Section III describes a theoretical model of the tontine 
and compares the performance of an optimal tontine with that of lotteries.  Section IV 
concludes. 
II.  Tontines throughout History 
  Lorenzo Tonti was a Neopolitan of little distinction until his sponsor, Cardinal 
Mazarin of France, who was responsible for the financial health of France, supported his 
position in the court of the French King in the 1650s.  In this position, Tonti proposed a 
form of a life contingent annuity with survivorship benefits, whereby subscribers, who 
were grouped into different age classes, would make a one-time payment of 300 livres to 
the government.  Each year, the government would make a payment to each group 
equaling five percent of the total capital contributed by that group.  These payments 
would be distributed among the surviving group members based upon each agent’s share 
of total group contributions.  The government’s debt obligation would cease with the 
death of the last member of each group.  Although the plan was supported 
enthusiastically by Louis XIV, Tonti’s plan was rejected by the French Parliament for 
two reasons: (i) the uncertain nature of total government debt obligations and (ii) the 
proposed rate of return was low in comparison with rates on life annuities (Weir, 1989). 
3   While the Netherlands started a successful tontine in 1670, it was not until 1689, 
when France was engaged in the Nine Years’ War, that France offered its first national 
tontine.  The design was quite similar to that originally proposed by Tonti.  Later 
offerings in France coincided with peaks in national capital demand during periods of 
war and were generally successful in raising the sought-after capital.  During France’s 
four major wars of this period, national tontine offerings raised approximately 110 
million livres from around 110,000 individuals.  
  Contrary to the relative success enjoyed by France, tontine offerings in England 
often failed to raise the desired capital.  England provided its first national tontine in 
1693; this initial tontine generated but a tenth of the one million pounds set as its goal.  
Yet England did successfully use the tontine to fund many public projects, including 
construction of the Richmond Bridge, claimed to be the oldest standing “London” Bridge.  
Unlike many of the early French tontines, English tontines frequently allowed agents to 
purchase numerous shares. 
  While the use of tontines to finance government projects was predominately a 
European endeavour, the notion that tontines could be used as a means to finance national 
debt has a historical basis in the U.S as well.  Faced with growing principal liability on 
national debt, Alexander Hamilton proposed a national tontine in the U.S. in his 1790 
Report Relative to a Provision for the Support of Public Credit (Jennings et al., 1988).  
Hamilton’s proposal was to reduce principal repayments on national debt by converting 
old debt with principal that was repayable at the discretion of the government into debt 
demanding no return on principal.   
4   The structure of the tontine that Hamilton proposed was inspired by a tontine 
originally proposed by William Pitt in 1789.  The proposed tontine included six age 
classes, and shares in the tontine would be sold for $200 with no limit on the number of 
shares that any agent could purchase.  Individuals could subscribe on their own lives or 
on the lives of others nominated by them.  However, Hamilton proposed a freeze 
component on debt repayment:  the annuities of subscribers who passed away would be 
divided among living subscribers until only twenty percent of the original subscribers 
remained.  Once this threshold was reached, the payments to remaining survivors would 
be frozen for the duration of their lives (Dunbar, 1888).   
Tontine Insurance in the United States 
  While tontines proper were not used after the
 eighteenth century, an adaptation of 
the tontine was implemented in the U.S. life insurance market in 1868.  Tontine insurance 
was introduced in 1868 by the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U.S.  Under 
tontine insurance, premiums served two distinct purposes: (i) provision of standard life 
insurance benefits and (ii) creation of an individual investment fund.  Under tontine 
insurance, policyholders deferred receipt of the dividend payments of standard premium 
insurance policies.  The deferred dividends were pooled and invested by the insurance 
company on behalf of the policyholders for a specified time period.  At the end of this 
period, the fund plus the investment earnings were divided proportionately among the 
entire active, surviving policyholders.  Investment earnings could be received as either 
cash or as a fully paid life annuity.  Beneficiaries of policyholders that passed away 
before the end of the tontine period received the specified death benefits, but had no 
claim on the tontine fund money (Ransom and Sutch, 1987).  
5   Conceptually, tontine insurance had several advantages relative to a standard life 
insurance policy.  Policyholders were able to secure life insurance plus create a 
retirement fund.  Survivors could receive a generous rate of return on these investments if 
a large proportion of other group members were to pass away or allow their policy to 
lapse.  Tontine insurance provided an opportunity for young individuals to save for 
retirement by providing a low-risk, high-yield investment fund available on an 
installment plan.  Unfortunately, corruption by the insurance companies led to the 
prohibition of tontine insurance sales by 1906 (Ransom and Sutch, 1987).            
III.  Tontine Theory 
  To model a tontine as an instrument to fund public goods, we must define the 
utility structure of agents and their probability of survival in a particular period.  For the 
former, we consider n agents   whose utility is assumed additively separable in 
monetary wealth and the benefits from the public good: 
1,..., i = n
() ii i uy h G = + ,      
where   is a numeraire and   the provision level of the public good.  We assume   
to be increasing and concave ( , 
i y G () i hG
'( ) 0 i h > i ''( ) 0 i h ≤ i ).
4  We make the standard public good 
assumption—that it is socially desirable to provide a positive amount of the public good, 
i.e.,    '(0) 1 i ih > ∑
Given an initial endowment w of wealth (income), the choice facing the agent is 
to determine the amount   of wealth to invest in the tontine.  Investment   in the  i b i b
                                                 
4 For studies that relax the assumption of utility being dependent upon only the level of the public good see 
Sugden (1982; 1984) and Andreoni (1990); these theories suggest that if one were to rewrite utility such 
that it is a function of both the level of the funds raised and own individual contributions, then the standard 
result of free-riding behavior can be reversed. 
 
6 tontine provides the agent with an uncertain monetary return  i x  that is dependent upon 
her own contributions and those of all other members of a group:  
() ii i i uw xbh G =+−+ .        
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Payments are covered by the players’ contributions, i.e., the level of public good 




i it GBP b P
−
== =−= −
0 t ∑ ∑        
In each period t, some individuals might die (exit the game).  All survivors 
receive a payment that is determined by their relative contribution level.  That is, for a 








Bt is the sum of the contributions made by the remaining players in period t.  
We assume that each agent has a perish probability in period t given by  t µ  where 





t M  where 
1
t
t s M t µ
= =∑ .  The probability of agents’ deaths is i.i.d.  Finally we assume 
for simplicity that agents are risk-neutral and payments are perfectly substitutable across 
periods.  Denoting the set of kn ≤  participating agents (with positive contributions) by 
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5 the ex ante expected utility of a player i is given by 
0
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5 We will later show that all agents participate: kn =  if there is (at least) one t for which   and 
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(1) 
In the following we will first consider the case of symmetric risk-neutral agents.  Both 
assumptions are relaxed in later sections. 
III.1  Tontines for symmetric risk-neutral agents 
If all agents value the public good identically ( () () i hG h G = ), we can concentrate 
on symmetric equilibria.  Here, all n agents contribute at a level b such that total 
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We now consider the optimal design of a tontine.  In particular, we address the 
question of how an organization—government or private charitable fundraiser—with a 
fixed prize budget, , should allocate this prize money across t ≥ 0 distinct time 







Proposition 1 (Optimal tontine—Symmetric risk-neutral agents) 
If agents are symmetric and risk-neutral, contributions to the public good using a 
tontine are maximal if all the payments are made in the first period, i.e., before 
anybody has passed away. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1:  
8 Contributions to the public good are clearly increasing in the right-hand side of the 
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which coincides with the right-hand side if all payments are made before any agent has 
perished, i.e.,  .É  0 PP =
The optimal tontine for symmetric agents, therefore, has a simple structure:  All 
agents receive a rebate proportional to their contributions relative to those of the total 
group.  This optimal structure implies that agents are not subject to any risk – all subjects 
receive their payment with certainty.  Given the contribution of all other agents, the 




, where P denotes the prize 
level.  
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 which can also be 
interpreted as the expected payoff in Morgan’s (2000) risk-neutral one-prize lottery.  All 
of his results therefore apply.  In particular, using his δ -financing rule, the tontine will 
9 always be carried out and the contributions will increase in the prize level, P, (see 
Morgan 2000, lemma 5).
6
Reconsidering the first-order condition for a symmetric equilibrium (2), the 
individual (b ) and the total (B) contribution levels for the optimal tontine are given by  
   
1
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n
.    (3) 
Note that the tontine raises a positive amount of money for the public good net of prize 
payments, as  
1
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,     
which coincides with the condition for a public good. 
We summarize these results as follows: 
Proposition 2 (Contribution levels for optimal tontines—Symmetric players) 
For symmetric players, the optimal tontine will always be carried out and raises 
contributions in excess of the prize-level P.  The provision level of the public good 
is increasing in P. 
 
Historically, tontines clearly have not reflected the optimal features derived in 
Proposition 1.  In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, tontine “prize” payments 
were made over a long time span.  That is, the tontines differed significantly from the 
optimal tontine in that repayments were made annually to the surviving subscribers 
instead of making all repayments before anybody died.  In the oft-used tontine repayment 
system, however, subscribers could die in any period s (even before any payment was 
 
6 The optimal tontine that we study in this paper provides a rebate (subsidy) on individual contributions to 
the public good.  This feature resembles the study relating government subsidies and contributions to a 
public good by Andreoni and Bergstrom (1996).  In their case, however, subsidies are financed by taxes, 
whereas in our model the rebates are taken out of the contribution to the public good.  The provision of the 
public good therefore does not depend on the possibility of enforcing tax payments.  To balance the budget, 
subsidy rates in our model are not exogenously fixed but endogenously given by the individual relative to 
total contributions. 
10 received) and thus would forego payments in all periods t > s with positive probability. 
To model this aspect of the mechanism, let us assume that the aggregate prize amount P 
is spread evenly across   periods. In other words,   for 1 .   1 TT ≤−   / t PP T =   tT ≤≤  
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   ,  (4) 
for which we obtain the following result: 
 
Proposition 3 (Suboptimal tontines – Effect of   and n)  T  
Contributions to the public good using a tontine that pays a fixed prize-level in 
 periods are decreasing in T . For any given T , they converge towards 
the contributions to an optimal tontine (or lottery) if the number of (potential) 
participants, n, increases. 
1 TT ≤−      
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
In order to show that contributions decrease in T , it is sufficient to show that the right- 
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It is clear that for   all the summands are negative.  For  , 
however, we obtain: 
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To prove the convergence result, we compare the right-hand side of the optimal 
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converges to zero for all   when n goes to infinity.  This is easily demonstrated 
numerically. É 
0 M ≤< 1
Proposition 3 highlights that the inefficiency of tontines that pay in later periods is 
less severe when many participants are expected to participate.  As a further feature of 
such tontines, the expected payments in period  , conditional on agent survival, are 
clearly small in the beginning (as the likelihood of others’ survival is high) but increase 
rapidly toward the terminal period.  As an investment instrument for retirement funds, the 
tontine therefore provides advantages compared to other instruments.  In particular, if one 
t
12 relaxes the assumption of risk-neutrality and perfect substitutability across periods, the 
tontine is quite practical economically if agents have decreasing external income (salary, 
pension) and can use the tontine to flatten their temporal payoff streams. 
 
Example 1 




µ =  for all 1 tT ≤ ≤ .  Assume that there are   symmetric 
agents and   periods.  Figure 1 shows the contribution level to the T -tontine 
relative to the contribution level to the optimal tontine.  For the 
50 n =
50 T =  
50 T =   -tontine, Figure 2 
illustrates the expected payments in period t given survival (payments relative to payment 
in period 1).  













Figure 1:  
Total contributions as a function of T  (normalized)   
Figure 2:  
Expected payments in period t given survival 
(normalized)  
 
Figure 1 reveals that contributions remain above 90 percent of the optimal levels even if 
one spreads the tontine payment over the whole potential lifespan of agents.  Figure 2 
13 shows that expected payments in period t, given that the agent survives until then, 
increase rapidly toward the end of an agent’s lifespan.  
III.2  Tontines and risk-aversion 
Lange et al. (2004) have shown that contributions to lotteries are decreasing in the 
level of risk-aversion.  For the optimal tontine, however, players are not exposed to any 
risk.  The optimal tontine is therefore a more efficient instrument for fundraising than any 
lottery. 
 
Proposition 4 (Tontines for risk-averse players) 
Individual contributions under the tontine that pays only before any agent has 
died are independent of the risk posture of agents. If agents are risk-averse but 
symmetric with respect to their valuation of the public good, it dominates any 
lottery as a fundraising instrument. 
 
Besides this superiority of tontines for risk-averse agents, a fundraiser does not need any 
prior beliefs over the risk preference of a potential donor pool when designing the 
fundraising instrument. 
III.3  Tontines with heterogeneous agents 
We have seen in the previous section that the optimal tontine for symmetric risk-
neutral players coincides with a single-prize lottery or—equivalently—a rebate scheme. 
In this section, we consider the performance of tontines for agents with heterogeneous 
valuation of the public good.  Conditions are derived under which the rebate scheme, i.e., 
the degenerate tontine, is optimal.  
Reconsidering the individual first-order conditions (1), first observe that if there is 
(at least) one t for which   and  0 t P > 0 t M 1 < < , all players will contribute.  The intuition 
is that there is a chance that in period t only one agent will survive.  An agent can secure 
14 himself this prize   by contributing.  More formally, looking at the first-order 
condition for  , the right-hand side is clearly infinite (consider 
0 t P >
0 iS ∉ 0 \ SSi = ). 
 
Proposition 5 (Participation in tontines):  
If there is period t for which   and  0 t P > 0 t M 1 < < , then all players contribute to the 
tontine.  
 
Even a slight deviation from the degenerate tontine ( 0 PP = ) (alias the rebate scheme) 
towards   can therefore lead to a discontinuous change in participation and 
therefore contribution levels.  In general, we obtain the following result when a tontine 
should pay out part of the prizes in later periods: 
0 0, t PP >< P
1
 
Proposition 6 (Tontines—Heterogeneous agents):  
If agents are sufficiently heterogeneous with respect to their valuation of the public good, 
the optimal tontine pays   for some   with 0 0 t P > 0 t > t M < < . In particular, if a set   
of players participates for  , then contributions can be increased by changing to 
 ( ) 
0 S
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0 t P > 0 t PP P +=
(i)  if  , i.e., there is (at least) one agent  kn < 0 iS ∉  who does not contribute if 
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Proof: 
We analyze the tontine that pays  t P ε =  and  0 PP ε = − .  Here, the first-order conditions 
(1) are given by: 
1




1' ( ) ( ) ( 1 )
(( ) )
11
'( ) ( ) (1 )
()
n ln l ii
it t lS i S S l
n ln l
it t lS S l
i
B bB
hBP P M M
BB
nn













−− = − + −
−
⎢ ⎥ − ⎣ ⎦
⎡⎤ −−
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discontinuity in participation and contribution at  0 ε =  when  t P ε =  and  0 PP ε =− .  We 
therefore study the limit of the first-order conditions (5) from above ( ) and get 
, where   is the set for which 
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from which the claim follows immediately.  
Case 2 











 for all i at  .  Then, the 
first-order conditions (5) also hold for 
0 PP =
0 PP =  (as all individual first-order conditions (1) 
16 hold with equality).  For  t P ε =  and  0 PP ε = − , we study the derivative of B with respect 
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Using the equilibrium conditions 
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and completes the proof. É 
We have demonstrated above that the tontine with  0 PP =  coincides with a single-
prize lottery.  Let us therefore finally compare the conditions in Proposition 5 with those 
under which one can improve upon the single-prize lottery by offering multiple prizes.  
As shown by Lange et al. (2004), one can improve upon the single prize lottery by 
providing (at least) a second prize if: 
00
2 1( 1 )
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17 On the one hand, we immediately see that one can design a tontine that outperforms any 
lottery if   and  kn <
0
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−− ∑ , one can increase the contributions to the lottery by offering 
a second prize, but cannot improve upon the degenerate tontine if  
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for all t.  This, for example, would be the case if  t M  is close to one for all t.  In such 
cases, the right-hand side of the inequality would be close to zero. 
We therefore can summarize our findings in the following Proposition: 
Proposition 7 (Tontines vs. lotteries—Heterogeneous agents):  
If agents are risk-neutral and heterogeneous with respect to their valuation of the 
public good, then there exist situations in which appropriately designed tontines 
outperform lotteries and vice versa.  
 
  Note that in real-world applications there will always be agents who have no 
valuation, or only a below average valuation, for specific public goods.  In such cases, 
one can always improve upon a single prize lottery by using a tontine with   and 
; in this case all agents will contribute under the tontine.  
0 t P >
0 t M << 1
III.4  Tontine as a fundraising instrument  
A charity that seeks to fundraise using a literal version of the historical tontine to 
replace lotteries might find the simulation of the “probabilities to die” problematic since 
in each round one must have a random draw for all survivors.  The structure of the tontine 
18 can be used, however, to design a fundraising instrument (which we also call tontine) 
whose implementation is quite simple. 
For this, we abstract from the independent and identical probabilities of dying 
considered in the previous section.  Instead, sequentially draw one of the k participating 
persons which must leave the game.  That is, in period t the number of players is k-t.  For 
the payments, the sequence of “dying” is decisive.
7  Each sequence has the same 
probability given by 1/  if k players contribute.  As in the previous section, a certain 
amount of money is distributed among the remaining players according to their share in 
each period (i.e. before the next person leaves). 
! k
Compared to the preceding analysis, we only have to change the probability of a 
certain set S of players having passed away until period t from   to 
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while all the qualitative results remain valid.  In particular, payments should be made 
before anybody leaves the game ( 0 PP = ) if agents have similar valuation of the public 
good.  If agents are sufficiently heterogeneous, one can improve upon this degenerate 
tontine—and possibly upon any lottery—by choosing  0 PP < . 
                                                 
7 For example, given identical contributions, a person who leaves last gets the highest payment, the person 
who leaves first receives the lowest payment. 
19 IV.  Concluding Remarks 
  This article provides a theoretical exploration of tontines, a popular method of 
financing public goods that was introduced more than three centuries ago.  Even though 
tontines were once quite popular—the name “tontine” remains prominently displayed on 
several publicly funded projects around the world—little is known about their formal 
structure and whether it would be apropos to reintroduce tontines today.   
In this study, we highlight the best characteristics of the tontine that might be 
utilized in future fundraising drives by deriving the optimal tontine and formally linking 
the tontine to a popular modern fundraising scheme used by both government and 
charitable fundraisers: lotteries.  We show that the optimal tontine generates contributions 
that are equivalent to those under a single prize lottery when agents are symmetric and 
risk neutral.  For symmetric risk-averse agents, contributions under the optimal tontine 
strictly dominate contributions raised under any lottery type.  Further, the design of an 
optimal tontine is independent of underlying risk posture and generates contributions that 
weakly dominate those of any lottery.  If agents are sufficiently asymmetric, tontines 
yield higher contribution levels than the optimal lottery—having a chance of being the 
only survivor in a period with positive payment provides incentives for all players to 
contribute.  If a fundraiser also seeks a high participation rate in order to collect the 
names of potential contributors for future fundraising drives, then the tontine has an 
additional “hidden” advantage in that it maximizes participation rates.   
While this article has addressed the performance of tontines as a fundraising 
mechanism, there are a number of outstanding issues.  For example, under the optimal 
tontine each agent receives a positive monetary payment with certainty.  The ex post 
20 allocation of wealth is thus more equitable than that which results from any k-prize 
lottery.  Given that inequality-averse preferences have been found to be prevalent among 
agents in laboratory experiments (see, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and 
Ockenfels, 2000), there are reasons to suspect that contribution levels under a tontine 
would exceed even those predicted by our model.  We hope that future work examines 
this issue in greater detail and evaluates the performance of tontines in the laboratory and 
in the field.       
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